Belsat.eu has tried to figure out what Belarus might face by supporting the Russian aggression against Ukraine.
Threat of human loss
Today, Lukashenka’s Belarus is an accomplice to Putin’s aggression against Ukraine. Missile and, probably, airstrikes are launched from the territory of Belarus, from here a large-scale ground offensive of Russian troops is unfolding, threatening Kyiv. Thus, the actions of the Belarusian side fully fall under the definition of “aggression” in accordance with Resolution 3314 of the UN General Assembly of December 14, 1974 (Article 3, paragraph “f”).
So far, the Belarusian military is not directly involved in hostilities. But the situation can change at any moment. On February 24, Lukashenka openly stated that “if it is necessary for Belarus and Russia”, Belarusian soldiers will also be sent to the war against Ukraine. Judging by this statement, Moscow has the last word here. Similarly, Lukashenka has previously spoken out about the fate of the Russian military in Belarus after the Union Resolve exercise, preparing the audience for the fact that they will stay here.
The more the Russian army suffers losses in Ukraine, the more the Kremlin will need reserves and new units at the front. In this situation, the question of the direct participation of the Belarusian army in the war may naturally arise. And given the scale of the military campaign, such participation certainly cannot be bloodless: the Belarusian army will suffer losses.
By the way, losses are possible not only if the Belarusian military crosses the border with Ukraine. Since Belarus is already complicit in aggression, and its territory is used to attack Ukraine, the Ukrainian army has the legal right to launch counterattacks (missile or air, as well as sabotage) against Russian troops in Belarus or the military infrastructure they use. However, so far Ukraine has not taken these steps.
Limitation of sovereignty
The use of Belarusian territory to attack Ukraine has demonstrated the depth of Belarus’s dependence on Russia. In just a year and a half, Belarus has turned from a peacekeeping site of the Donbas conflict into a springboard for Russian aggression. Moreover, this transformation was accompanied by a complete loss of subjectivity and independence.
From Lukashenka’s commentary on these events, it followed that Putin on the morning of February 24 simply informed him of his intentions to conduct a “special operation” against Ukraine, and did not ask for permission to use the territory of Belarus. It is quite possible that in this case Lukashenka artificially distances himself from this decision.
But now Belarus, in any case, looks like a country that has completely dissolved in the Kremlin’s imperial course and is not capable of pursuing an independent policy, managing its territory and army. Even the question of the participation of the Belarusian military in the war Lukashenka publicly links it to whether Russia will need it.
However, the use of Belarusian territory for the invasion not only demonstrated dependence on the Kremlin but also deepened it, as it dragged the country into an even tougher confrontation with the West and knocked the last argument for negotiations out of the hands of official Minsk.
Earlier, the Lukashenka regime has repeatedly speculated on the West’s unwillingness to allow the expansion of Russia’s influence, which could lead to the absorption of Belarus. The official Minsk also used this argument when criticizing the sanctions.
“The European Union will lose Belarus forever,” Uladzimir Makei said in December 2021, addressing Western politicians. But now that Belarus has become a springboard for Russian aggression, this argument has completely lost its meaning: there is nothing more to blackmail the West with.
Over the past year and a half, there has already been a trend when Western leaders discussed the problems of Belarus with the Kremlin. Now that will be the end of the matter: the West has nothing to talk about with Lukashenka if Russian troops are on the territory of the country.
Russia, in turn, under these conditions, will be even more persistent in limiting the sovereignty of Belarus in all areas: the war gives Moscow virtually unlimited levers of pressure on Lukashenka.
Lower living standards
For supporting the Russian invasion, the Lukashenka regime ran into a new wave of sanctions. Already on the first day of the war, the United States imposed sanctions on a number of military, businessmen, banks, and defense enterprises of Belarus.
“Belarus became an accomplice, allowing its territory to be used for warfare.
We have made it clear to Belarus that in this case, it will face the consequences of a new level.
These consequences are beginning now,” said US ambassador Julie Fisher.
Because of the war, new sanctions against Belarus are planned to be introduced by the European Union and Great Britain. Moreover, it is unlikely that the case will be limited to one package: the sanctions are likely to be added over time. Naturally, trade and economic ties with Ukraine itself will also suffer huge losses.
At the same time, it will be much more difficult for Belarus to cope with sanctions restrictions (both new and previous ones), since at the same time unprecedented sanctions are being imposed against Russia. On the one hand, the Kremlin’s ability to financially help the Lukashenka regime will be reduced for objective reasons. On the other hand, all those economic problems that Russia will face after the current events will indirectly affect the Belarusian economy, since it is closely connected with the Russian one.
All this in the medium and long term will inevitably lead to a significant drop in living standards.
Repressions and fate of political prisoners
Any war tends to overshadow all other topics and problems. Russia’s attack on Ukraine will be no exception. The topic of political terror in Belarus and the fate of political prisoners has lost its priority and will now inevitably attract much less attention both at the national and international levels. Repression will not go away. Moreover, the atmosphere of war (now a very real war, and not fictional propagandist, as it used to be) can lead to the fact that repression will become even more brutal, as the last restrictions will be lifted.
The “theme” of repressions will also expand: those who oppose the war and support Ukraine are likely to fall under persecution. Already now there is information about the first detentions and “repentant videos” of Belarusians who criticized Russian aggression online.
Although there will be less attention to political repressions in the international arena, Belarus will definitely not disappear from the agenda. Since the country is an ally of Russia in this war, Belarus will also be perceived as a security threat in the region and therefore attract attention.
Split among Lukashenka’s supporters
On the eve of the war, Lukashenka used extremely harsh militaristic rhetoric, which sometimes surpassed even what the Russian leaders said. But immediately after the start of the war, militarism almost disappeared from Lukashenka’s statements. On February 24, at a meeting with the security forces, although he justified the actions of Russia, criticized official Kyiv, he did not promise to reach the English Channel, defeat Ukraine in 3-4 days and return it to the “bosom of Slavism”. “There is no way we can get involved in this shit,” he emotionally concluded.
On February 24, while visiting the Minsk Scientific and Practical Center for Surgery, Transplantology and Hematology, Lukashenka actually avoided the topic of the war altogether, only rather mildly noting in connection with the Ukrainian issue that Ukraine had followed a special course since Soviet times.
All this is explained by the fact that Lukashenka understands that even his nuclear electorate will not unite around the topic of war (real, not the virtual propagandist one).
According to a recent Chatham House poll, only 5% of Belarusian citizens are ready to agree that Belarusian conscripts will die in the war with Ukraine. Only 12% of the respondents can agree that the Belarusian contract soldiers will fight. Only 11% do not consider the participation of Belarus in the war a catastrophe. The numbers are very revealing that according to a preliminary poll by Chatham House, Lukashenka was named the worthiest candidate for the presidency by 27%.
That is, even the majority of Lukashenka’s supporters are not ready to support Belarus’ participation in Russian aggression. If it comes to the fact that the Belarusian military will die at the front, the situation may worsen so much that a new protest majority will form in society. However, so far, on the second day of the conflict, there are no signs that large anti-war protests could explode in Belarus that could threaten the Lukashenka regime.
