Who is allowed to insult Putin?

One man in Russia is allowed to vulgarly insult Putin, his Minister, and his Generals with immunity because he has an army of mercenaries and a protective umbrella of a growing coterie.

One episode of the popular tv American cartoon “Family Guy” features Chelyabinsk, a city in Russia. In the episode, Russia is depicted as dirty, drunk, and aggressive, with police officers physically abusing citizens over the Ukrainian flag. Additionally, malevolent services are shown constantly watching over residents. This portrayal raises the question of how someone can publicly criticize Russia’s President, Ministers, and Generals, especially when even American children know that Russia is not a tolerant democracy.

Without a doubt, there is a person in Russia who has immunity. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the owner of the mercenary Wagner Group, had been seeking support from Moscow commands while cursing them for weeks. One day he asked for ammunition and help for his mini-army. The next day, he offended the military and civil authorities with vulgar language. It was a rollercoaster of emotion.

“Shoigu, Gerasimov, where the f**K is my ammunition!?” – not long ago, he addressed the Defense Minister and Chief of Staff of the Russian army in the following manner.

He made a highly offensive remark about the army command. In Russia, even minor criticism, let alone insults, can result in imprisonment for many individuals. Despite the verbal outrage, Prigozhin also simultaneously revealed several inconvenient secrets of the army. According to his statement, the Russian 72nd Motorized Brigade allegedly fled the Bakhmut battlefield. At the same time, he started blackmailing the Kremlin by threatening to withdraw the Wagnerians from Bakhmut if he didn’t receive ammunition and support. This behavior is considered as crossing a specific red line.

Prigozhin knows many secrets. Previously, he organized tours of Russian mercenaries to Syria, Libya, and Africa. He has arranged expeditions involving Russian mercenaries in Syria, Libya, and Africa. Additionally, he has acted as a mediator in private business dealings and special operations involving Russian services. He is also well-informed about the behind-the-scenes events of the invasion of Ukraine. Prigozhin possesses firsthand knowledge of corruption within Putin’s team, unlike Alexei Navalny and other opposition figures who rely primarily on online investigations to expose such secrets. It is important to note that Prigozhin is involved in these corrupt activities himself, following Putin’s instructions.

Recently, he just signaled that he could start talking. The high level of public frankness from someone in his position is concerning and potentially more harmful than insults. Prigozhin has been a prominent figure in the Russian elite circle for many years and is well-versed in the game’s rules and what’s at stake. If he allows himself such bold statements and blackmail, he can do it. He must be protected. He likely has the backing of the Kremlin or an influential group within the Russian power elite clique.

Happy Grandpa

The schizophrenic rollercoaster of emotions led Prigozhin to surpass the red line limit. People have become accustomed to his accusations directed at Minister Sergei Shoigu and the army’s Chief of Staff. However, attacking Putin is one step too far and crosses a critical boundary.

“Happy Grandpa thinks he’s fine?” (…) I hope for his excellent health if he is correct. However, what actions should the country take? What should our children and grandchildren do for the future of Russia? “If this Pop-Pop turns out to be a complete asshole, by some chance, how can we expect to win the war?” – this is what Prigozhin argued in a recording posted online on May 9, Victory Day celebrated in Russia.

More likely, anyone can guess who this “grandaddy” might be. Afterward, the leader of the mercenaries clarified that he was referring to individuals such as Mikhail Mizintev, the former Deputy Defense Minister, Valery Gerasimov, the Head of Staff, or Natalia Chim, a pro-Russian activist from Donetsk. He made it transparent that he was not explicitly mentioning Putin.

The explanations being given become more twisted and absurd, but the Kremlin fully comprehends the intended message.

The gauntlet has been thrown down at Putin. Despite being a well-known figure in Russia, Prigozhin lacks political influence due to his criminal-like appearance and behavior. If he were to pursue an independent political career and given the opportunity, he would be backed by many Russians who share his ideologies. The support may come from diverse groups, including veterans, prisoners, and individuals attracted to anarchist protest slogans. This group typically doesn’t participate in voting, making it difficult for them to influence national decisions. Additionally, Prigozhin lacks any compelling political ideas beyond criticizing the army command.

Who is holding the protective umbrella?

The focus is not on Prigozhin himself. He’s just a rebel warlord. There are various ways to remove him from his position, but it could be difficult due to Prigozhin’s significant growth in recent years. He has established a small empire with the help of orders from the army and services, including mercenary companies, a lucrative supply business for the armed forces, “consulting companies,” and conducting psychological operations in the West and Africa. Besides, he owns the Patriot media group, which holds significant influence in the Russian province.

The Kremlin has access to more powerful tools at its disposal. The Moscow administration could discredit Prigozhin by launching a media campaign that would label him as a traitor and usurper. However, this has not been done yet, because the Wagnerians are needed at Bakhmut. But it is possible to envision the Wagnerians operating without Prigozhin, despite his influence. His ability to criticize the Kremlin without consequences is due to his participation in the struggle for power and the protection he receives from influential allies. The protective umbrella extends over him.

The leader of the Wagnerists has established strong connections with Alexei Dyumin, Governor of the Tula region, and with Dmitry Mironov, the former Governor of the Yaroslavl region. Both belong to the second league of the Russian power elite. Moreover, this group is highly ambitious and desires to move up to the top of the political career ladder. Dyumin and Mironov are individuals in their 40s and 50s with military backgrounds and have previously worked in Putin’s security team at the Kremlin. They have experience in various government agencies such as the Committee for State Security (KGB), Federal Security Service (FSB), Federal Guard Service (FSO), and Ministry of Internal Affairs. Dyumin was the Deputy Head of Military Intelligence of the Chief Intelligence Office (GRU) at the time of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. He commanded the “Ukrainian Operation.” Dyumin also held the position of Chief of Staff for the land forces and served as Deputy Minister of Defense for a year. While his military experience is impressive, he has also demonstrated competence in civilian administration. He was initially appointed as the Governor of Tula by the president but later won the election and is popular in the region. Furthermore, he maintains a close relationship with Viktor Zolotov, the Head of Rosgvardiya and known as Putin’s bodyguard.

Among their inner circle is Yuri Kovalchuk, a billionaire who has been close to Putin since the 1990s. He owns shares in the Rossiya bank and runs a media empire. Former President and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev is sometimes associated with this clique, raging with increasingly absurd statements. It seems unlikely that he will have the prospect of pursuing a more prominent political career. He still has the potential to be a representative for the ambitious and determined clique, especially as his strong and forceful remarks align with the rhetoric of Prigozhin and other influential figures.

There are reports that Yuri Kovalchuk advised Putin to invade Ukraine. Meanwhile, as the Governor of Tula, Dyumin takes pride in providing better uniforms and equipment for conscripts from the region. This faction is not made up of “doves” or liberals. Prigozhin’s accusations of corruption, cowardice, and incompetence within the Kremlin may set the stage for someone to propose a more efficient approach to war.Recently, certain events have highlighted the vulnerabilities within the army’s leadership and Putin’s weaknesses. A drone attack on the Kremlin, a lower-scale parade on May 9, failures near Bakhmut, and explosions in Russia are no longer words of criticism but actual circumstances supporting the message full of complaints. A new candidate with more credibility than Putin and his senior team is being sought. This move is reminiscent of events prior to Boris Yeltsin’s departure, which led to his resignation and paved the way for Putin’s rise to power. At the time, Putin was seen as energetic, ambitious, and from the second league circle.

The political struggle will intensify. There is a high likelihood that the conflict involving Ukraine will be the primary focus of attention. The Russian bureaucratic elite will soon face their first primary challenge, as regional elections are scheduled for September. These elections will include the election of governors in 21 districts and four occupied regions within Ukraine. Moscow’s Mayoral will be elected too. In addition, the local parliamentary elections will also take place.

The presidential election will take place next year. Putin will face a substantial risk soon. Shortly, it will become apparent whether the broad power elite still considers him a reliable source of stability or if they begin searching for a new guarantor. It is currently difficult to make a definitive judgment. However, an influential and daring inner circle is at the heart of this exclusive and highly regarded “elite of all elites” community, known as the “Chekist” league. Furthermore, this clique is armed and honors war legends. It also holds sway over the local, central, and oligarchy governing bodies. It’s possible they are only interested in promoting people from their group to vital positions within the Ministry of Defense or the army command. They may even want to achieve higher levels of power.

Michał Kacewicz/ belsat.eu

Translated by PEV.